

PhD Student paper: Tan NGUYEN

Detection and mitigation of emerging attacks in virtualized Named Data Networking (NDN) environment

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I. CONTEXT

The IP network, which was originally designed to merely connect two computers from a distance, is exposing its limits in front of emerging Internet users' and business' requirements which transforms the Internet in a planet-scale framework for content delivery. In this context, an evolution of current network architectures is occurring, inspired by the idea of naming content objects rather than naming nodes by IP address. Such an idea has been implemented into many Information Centric Network (ICN) proposals. Among them, **Named Data Networking (NDN)** [1] is the one receiving the most attentions of the research community. NDN shifts the semantics of network service, from delivering the packet to a destination, to retrieving data identified by a given name. This concept brings up important changes to the way the network works: (1) communication is driven by user requests; (2) seamless connection between content providers and users is no longer necessary; (3) mobility support is ensured by removing end-host identification and bringing in-network caches; (4) the latter in-network cache eventually increases the global content delivery performance; and finally (5) multi-path forwarding brings multicast delivery. NDN also brings in security primitives, by implementing signatures for all named data packets, and self-regulation of network traffic, through flow balance between Interest and Data packets.

While NDN appears as a promising solution for the Future Internet, its deployment is still limited to dedicated research testbeds. Furthermore, its adoption by Internet Service Providers (ISP) remains a challenge

due to required time and prohibitive cost of large scale deployment. However, the emerging *Network Function Virtualization* (NFV) [2], a concept where network functions can be virtualized and installed over shared pools of standardized commodity hardware resources, emerges as an advantageous means to accelerate and facilitate the deployment of NDN by stakeholders. From a security perspective, NFV also brings challenges and opportunities by (1) clearly separating the infrastructure level from the virtualized one, thus bringing an intrinsic solution to malicious network function isolation, and (2) through the use of *Software-Defined Networking* (SDN) [3], enabling an easy configuration and orchestration of network functions.

In this context¹, the main question and subsequent research topic which is raised is: “*By leveraging NFV for the deployment of NDN, what are the security threats these novel network functions expose? What are the most appropriate detection solutions and what are the related counter-measures?*”

II. SUMMARY OF ACHIEVED AND ONGOING WORK

In order to identify main security threats which could prevent the emerging NDN technology from being deployed, we have first performed a careful state of the art, fed by current literature in this area [5]. Given our initial objectives, in order to highlight the most relevant research direction, we have evaluated all the revealed attacks not only on the

¹The PhD is part of ANR project DOCTOR [4] (DepLOyment and seCurizaTION of new functiOnalities in virtualized networking enviRonments).

basis of their impacts on privacy, content delivery and damage scale, but also on their feasibility with the current NDN implementation and the amount of previous works on the corresponding issue. As a result, we have focused our next studies on Denial of Service (DoS) related attacks since they are among the easiest to carry out, while requiring the least efforts from an attacker (i.e. no need to corrupt a router or server, no need to cheat with a certification authority).

Especially, *interest flooding* [6] appears as an easily-created attack while providing the most serious damages. The attack consists, for the attacker, in flooding the network with *Interest* packets for non-existing content. Due to the stateful nature of NDN routers, which maintains a *Pending Interest Table (PIT)* in order to send to data packet back to the requesting user. Hence, the goal of this interest flooding attack is to overload the PIT, thus preventing the well-operating of the architecture for legitimate content delivery. While the state of the art already provides early solution against *interest flooding*, especially ones for attack detection, none of them can provide a well-grounded result. Specifically, they cannot provide a clearly-defined threshold for the detector, hence raising question for the network managers when they want to implement the proposed detectors. In addition, previous works cannot provide an expected theoretical performance, weaken authors' claim for an optimal result.

As such, the attack is addressed with a detector based on the statistical hypothesis testing theory. The proposed detector [7], [8] is evaluated based on data simulated in ndnSIM - a NDN network simulator largely adopted in the community. The hypothesis testing theory allows the proposed detector to have indisputable advantages over previous solutions for *interest flooding*. First, the theoretical performance of the proposed detector can be analytically established and the sharpness of those results have been confirmed with numerical experiments. This can help a lot in assessing the confidence given in a results, as it is possible to set the false-alarm (false-positive) and missed detection (false-negative) probabilities. Secondly, the detector's decision threshold is clearly defined, with simple enough computation, hence making the detector easy to be set up. Besides, the threshold does not depend on the attack's behavior but only on the desired false-alarm probability, which can be chosen to satisfy a trade-off between early detection

of attacks and decision reliability. Finally, while most of proposed prior solutions applies countermeasure universally, all the time, thus consuming resources and decreasing the content delivery performance, applying a low-computation-cost detector helps saving a lot of resources for the network as the counter measures is applied only when an attack is suspected.

III. FUTURE WORK

On the basis of this current work, our perspective of future research works are the followings:

- **Evaluate our detection solution with real data:** Although the results of the proposed detector for *interest flooding* are very promising, the current empirical performance was estimated with simulated data. Even though those data were obtained using very realistic models of traffic, there are still many aspects that can hardly be considered within simulation environments, such as the detection time, impact of real data against simulated ones, computation cost, etc. Hence, we plan to move from a pure simulation framework to real traffic data produced by the reproduction of the attack within a real environment. As such, in the context of DOCTOR project, a testbed for NDN will be deployed in a near future bringing the expected deployment environment. At first, the collected data will be processed off-line. However, dedicated monitoring probes will be deployed and the detector will be implemented in each of them to detect attack on-line.
- **Moving to a distributed detection scheme:** It is important to note that the current detector can be applied on any interface of NDN. However, in cases of distributed attack, the detection can hardly be carried out on single interface. Hence, a distributed detection scheme has to be proposed based on the detector deployed over each NDN device interface. Since the proposed detector has analytically known statistical performance, this could greatly help in the design of a reliable distributed detection method. On a more practical point of view, this would also greatly help pushing back distributed attacks and also the application of counter-measures.
- **Design a mitigation solution for *Interest Flooding*:** As a straight next step of this first perspective, we plan to design and implement a mitigation strategy, built as a part of an autonomous solution, which will especially leverage the SDN

technique to realize counter-measure actions and the NFV to implement it.

- **Explore a second major threat in NDN:**

As a second case of attack detection and mitigation, we have selected another form of DoS attack which can easily occur in NDN: *cache poisoning* [9], an attack aiming to inject forged content into caches and profiting from caching system to spread such content among users. Although NDN routers are allowed to verify data packets received and to remove altered packets, signature verification of each packet is computationally infeasible and not realistic. Hence, this is a dangerous attack which however receives less attention from the research community. With a methodology similar to the work achieved in Interest flooding, we plan to assess the attack process of such an attack, reproduce it in a simulated environment at first, design and dedicated detection and mitigation solutions and then move to a real implementation in the Doctor testbed [10].

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SPEAKER BIOGRAPHY

Tan NGUYEN is a first year PhD student in Troyes University of Technology (UTT), France. His PhD is co-supervised by Dr. Rémi COGRANNE and Dr. Guillaume DOYEN. His research area focuses on security issues in Information Centric Networks and especially the NDN proposal. His work takes part of the DOCTOR project, started in December 2014 and funded by the French National Agency of Research (ANR). This project, led by Orange, and gathering Thales, the Montimage, the LORIA-CNRS lab and UTT, aims at proposing solutions for the deployment, monitoring and security of ICN architectures deployed in a NFV context.

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